

Synchronous programming

Critical Real Time Embedded Software

David Lesens


Wednesday, 06 October 2010

Synchronous programming







- Eugene Asarin
- Mehdi Dogguy



- David Lesens



Overview

- Critical real-time embedded software 
- Principles of the approach 
 - Introduction 
 - Formal semantics 
- SCADE 
- Model validation 



Where can we find software?

- Windows, Linux
- PowerPoint
- Latex
- Compilers
- Mathematical software (e.g. computation of π)
- Mobile phone
- Space
- Nuclear plant
- Airplane
- ...

Software is everywhere...

Are all these pieces of software the same?

There is software and software

Our topic is

- Critical
- Real Time
- Embedded

Software

Real time?

- **Transformational systems**
 - Inputs available on execution **start**
 - Outputs delivered on execution **end**} e.g. Mathematical computation
- **Interactive systems**
 - React to their **environment**
 - To their own speed} e.g. Windows, Powerpoint
- **Reactive systems**
 - React to their **environment**
 - To a speed **imposed** by the environment} e.g. Control / Command of a spacecraft

Critical? What does it mean?

```
A problem has been detected and windows has been shut down to prevent damage to your computer.
```

```
DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
```

```
If this is the first time you've seen this Stop error screen, restart your computer. If this screen appears again, follow these steps:
```

```
Check to make sure any new hardware or software is properly installed. If this is a new installation, ask your hardware or software manufacturer for any windows updates you might need.
```

```
If problems continue, disable or remove any newly installed hardware or software. Disable BIOS memory options such as caching or shadowing. If you need to use Safe Mode to remove or disable components, restart your computer, press F8 to select Advanced Startup options, and then select Safe Mode.
```

```
Technical information:
```

```
*** STOP: 0x000000D1 (0x0000000C,0x00000002,0x00000000,0xF86B5A89)
```

```
*** gv3.sys - Address F86B5A89 base at F86B5000, DateStamp 3dd991eb
```

```
Beginning dump of physical memory
```

```
Physical memory dump complete.
```

```
Contact your system administrator or technical support group for further assistance.
```

Critical? What does it mean?

Intuitively, a **critical** system is a system which failure can have **severe impacts**

- Nuclear
- Aeronautic
- Automotive
- Railway
- Space
- ...

Software criticality levels

Standards define precisely software criticality levels:

For instance:

- DO178B and DO178C for airborne systems
- ECSS for space systems
 - European Committee for Space Standardization

Software criticality categories ECSS-Q-80C

Software criticality category	Definition
A	Software that if not executed, or if not correctly executed, or whose anomalous behaviour could cause or contribute to a system failure resulting in: Catastrophic consequences
B	Software that if not executed, or if not correctly executed, or whose anomalous behaviour could cause or contribute to a system failure resulting in: Critical consequences
C	Software that if not executed, or if not correctly executed, or whose anomalous behaviour could cause or contribute to a system failure resulting in: Major consequences
D	Software that if not executed, or if not correctly executed, or whose anomalous behaviour could cause or contribute to a system failure resulting in: Minor or Negligible consequences

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ECSS-Q-40B

Severity	Consequence
Catastrophic hazards	i) loss of life, life-threatening or permanently disabling injury or occupational illness, loss of an element of an interfacing manned flight system; ii) loss of launch site facilities or loss of system; iii) severe detrimental environmental effects.
Critical hazards	i) temporarily disabling but not life-threatening injury, or temporary occupational illness; ii) major damage to flight systems or loss or major damage to ground facilities; iii) major damage to public or private property; or iv) major detrimental environmental effects
Marginal hazards	minor injury, minor disability, minor occupational illness, or minor system or environmental damage
Negligible hazards	less than minor injury, disability, occupational illness, or less than minor system or environmental damage

ECSS-Q-40B

Severity	Consequence
Catastrophic hazards	i) <u>loss of life, life-threatening</u> or permanently disabling injury or occupational illness, loss of an element of an interfacing manned flight system; ii) loss of launch site facilities or loss of system; iii) severe detrimental environmental effects.
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DO178B differs lightly from the ECSS

Severity	Consequence
Catastrophic	Failure conditions which would prevent continued <u>safe flight and landing</u>
Hazardous / Severe-Major	Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be: (1) a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, (2) physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew could not be relied on to perform their tasks accurately or completely, or (3) adverse effects on occupants <u>including serious or potentially fatal injuries to small number of those occupants</u>
Major	Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, or discomfort to occupants, possibly including injuries
Minor	Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aircraft safety, and which would involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight
No Effect	Failure conditions which do not affect the operational capability of the aircraft or increase crew workload

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Vocabulary

- **Security**
 - is the degree of protection against danger, loss, and criminals.
- **Reliability**
 - is the ability of a person or system to perform and maintain its functions in routine circumstances, as well as hostile or unexpected circumstances.
- **Safety**
 - is the state of being "safe" (from French *sauf*), the condition of being protected against [...] consequences of failure, damage, error, accidents, harm or any other event which could be considered non-desirable. It can include protection of people or of possessions.



Safety & Security in Software Engineering

- The key difference between security and reliability is that security must take into account the actions of people attempting to cause destruction.

Safety

- The software must not harm the world

Security

- The world must not harm the software


Example 1: The First "Computer Bug"

Photo # NH 96566-KN First Computer "Bug", 1945

9/2
9/9

0800 Antan started
1000 " stopped - antan ✓
1300 (033) MP-MC 1.58477000
033) PRO 2 2.130476415
connect 2.130676415
Relays 6-2 in 033 failed special speed test
in relay .. 11.00 test.

1100 Started Cosine Tape (Sine check)
1525 Started Multi-Adder Test.

1545  Relay #70 Panel F
(moth) in relay.

1630 Antan started.
1700 closed down.

First actual case of bug being found.

Relay 3145
Relay 3376

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Example 2: The Patriot Missile Failure

On February 25, 1991, during the Gulf War, an American Patriot Missile battery in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, failed to track and intercept an incoming Iraqi Scud missile. The Scud struck an American Army barracks, **killing 28 soldiers and injuring around 100 other people**. A report of the General Accounting office, GAO/IMTEC-92-26, entitled *Patriot Missile Defense: Software Problem Led to System Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia* reported on the cause of the failure. It turns out that the cause was an **inaccurate calculation of the time** since boot **due to computer arithmetic errors**.

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Failure in space



Trident









Sea launch

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
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
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
NASA's Climate Orbiter was lost September 23, 1999,
due to a **software bug**

One engineering team used **metric units**
while another used **English units**

Why is System (to Software) Engineering
complicated?



The V development cycle



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Costs of critical software development


- Specification 10%
- Design 10%
- Development/TU 25%
- Integration tests 5%
- **Validation 50%**

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
Late detection of errors



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
Cost of error correction



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Verification with model driven engineering



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Formal Model Driven Engineering shall allow

- An early verification of the specification via a strong and intuitive semantic ensuring
 - Consistency
 - Completeness
 - Non ambiguity
- A behavioural validation within a simulation environment
- Automatic generation of certified code
- Formal proof

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There are two ways of constructing a software design. One way is to make it so simple that there are **obviously** no deficiencies. And the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no **obvious** deficiencies.

*Professor C. A. R. Hoare
The 1980 Turing award lecture*





Formal semantics of programming languages

In **theoretical computer science**, formal semantics is the field concerned with the **rigorous** mathematical study of the **meaning** of programming languages and models of computation

Syntax

- Is it only what you say that matters?
- And not so much how it is said?

- A good syntax shall be
 - Clear
 - Unambiguous
 - Intuitive

Statement groups

- In C, C++, Java

```
if ( light == red );  
{  
    Cancel_lift_off();  
}
```

Legal statement
No warning

The call to
Cancel_lift_off
is always executed

- In Ada

```
if light = red then;  
    Cancel_lift_off;  
end if;
```

Illegal statement
No compilation

Named notation

- In C, C++, Java

```
struct date {  
    int day, month, year;  
};
```

- In Ada

```
type Date is  
record  
    Day, Month, Year : Integer;  
end record;
```

Named notation

- In C, C++, Java

```
struct date today = { 12, 1, 5 };
```

What does it mean?

- In Ada

```
Today: Date := ( Day => 12, Month => 1, Year => 5 );
```

→ Notation usable also for function call

Using distinct types

- In C++


```
int badcount, goodcount;  
int b_limit, g_limit;  
...  
badcount++;  
...  
if ( badcount == b_limit ) {  
...  
goodcount++;  
...  
if ( goodcount == b_limit ) {  
...  
}
```

Do we really mean that?

Using distinct types

▪ In Ada

```
type Goods is new Integer;  
type Bads is new Integer;  
badcount, b_limit : Goods  
goodcount, g_limit: Bads  
...  
badcount := badcount+1;  
...  
if badcount = b_limit then  
...  
goodcount := goodcount+1;  
...  
if goodcount = b_limit then  
...  
...
```

 **Strong typing is a good rule of critical software**

**Illegal
Bad typing**

Formal languages

▪ Programming languages are more or less formal

- ...
- Ada is more formal than Java
- Java is more formal than C++
- C++ is more formal than C
- C is more formal than Matlab
- ...

The risk of errors is less important with a formal language

```

case State is
when State1 =>
  Guard1 := X < 3;
  Guard2 := X > 3;
  if (EVENT1 and (Guard1 or Guard2)) then
    if (Guard1) then
      X := 5;
      State := State2;
    else
      if (Guard2) then
        X := 6;
      end if;
      State := State3;
    end if;
  end if;
when State2 =>
  if (EVENT1) then
    X := 7;
    State := State1;
  end if;
when State3 =>
  if (EVENT1 and EVENT1) then
    X := 8;
    State := State1;
  end if;
end case;

```


An other very simple example

Simple? Yes...

But what does this piece of code do?







Code (even Ada) is not an adequate way to communicate with system engineer

The same very simple example












➔ A graphical language with a high level of abstraction facilitates the communication

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- **SCADE** 
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Overview

- **Synchronous model** 
- Introduction to the Scade language 
- Editing a Scade model 
- Activation conditions 
- Automata 
- Arrays 
- Iterations 
- Global flows: Sensors and probes 
- Genericity 



Need of deterministic algorithm

- In computer science, a **deterministic** algorithm is an algorithm which, in informal terms, behaves **predictably**
- Given a particular input, it will always produce the same output, and the underlying machine will always pass through the same sequence of states



Determinism and ECSS

ECSS-Q-80C


- 6.2.3 Handling of critical software
- 6.2.3.2 The supplier shall define and apply measures to assure the dependability and safety of critical software. These measures can include:
 - ...
 - prohibiting the use of language commands and features that are unpredictable;
 - use of **formal design language for formal proof**;

Synchronous languages










Semantics = **synchronous** hypothesis

- Existence of a global clock
 - Software **cyclically** activated
 - Inputs read at the cycle beginning
 - Outputs delivered at cycle end
(read / write forbidden during the cycle)
- The cycle execution duration shall theoretically be null
 - ➔ **No cycle overflow**
- Mono-tasking
 - ➔ Ensures the **determinism**

Asynchronous versus synchronous



Overview


- Synchronous model 
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SCADE

“Safety Critical Application Development Environment”

- A textual language: **Lustre**
 - Formal language for **reactive synchronous** system
- A **graphical** language
 - Semantics equivalence SCADE ↔ Lustre
 - Adapted to **data flow** and **automata**
- A software toolbox
 - Graphical editor, simulator, proof tool
 - Automatic documentation and **certified** code generation
- Synchronous approach





Time in Scade

- **Global clock** (known by all processes)
 - Time = discrete sequence of tick t_0, t_1, t_2 , etc.
 - At each tick t_i a cycle is running
- **Variable = flow** which takes at each tick a unique value

Example: integer variable x

	t_0	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_4	t_5
x	5	8	2	3	13	5

Operators

- An operator acts on **flows of values** (and not on values)

Example

- Operator « + »: $\text{int}_n \times \text{int}_n \rightarrow \text{int}_n$

	t_0	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_4	t_5
x	5	8	2	3	13	5
x + x	10	16	4	6	26	10

Temporal operators

- The “**PRE**” operator takes as input a data flow (i.e. a variable) and returns its value at the **previous tick**.
At **initial tick**, its value is **undefined**.
- The “**→**” operator takes as input an **initialisation** value and a data flow of the same type. It returns an identical data flow, except for the initial value.

Example

	t_0	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_4	t_5
x	5	8	2	3	13	5
PRE x	null	5	8	2	3	13
9 → x	9	9	2	3	13	5
9 → PRE x	9	5	8	2	3	13

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“Follow by” operator


$$\text{FBY}(x, n, \text{init}) = \text{init} \rightarrow \underbrace{(\text{PRE}(\text{PRE} \dots x))}_{n \text{ times}}$$

	t_0	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_4	t_5
x	5	8	2	3	13	5
9 → PRE x	9	5	8	2	3	13
FBY(x,3,9)	9	9	9	5	8	2

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SCADE at a glance: Data Flow




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

Textual versus graphical

```
( x, y ) = A();
B( x, y );
C( y )
```



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“Mutual exclusion” operator

#: $\text{bool} \times \text{bool} \times \dots \times \text{bool} \rightarrow \text{bool}$

n times


Returns true
if at most one of its
inputs is true

e1	e2	e3	#(e1, e2, e3)
0	0	0	1
0	0	1	1
0	1	0	1
0	1	1	0
1	0	0	1
1	0	1	0
1	1	0	0
1	1	1	0

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
Delays

Generally
not used



Input

initial value



Output

Delay



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Node and function

$$y = f(x)$$

Function and nodes are represented by a rectangle

- A node has an internal state
- A function has **no** internal state



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

Imported function / node

- Imported function

```
extern void C(  
    bool Y );
```

- Imported node

```
extern void C_reset(  
    outC_C *outC );  
extern void C(  
    bool Y,  
    outC_C *outC );
```




Context to be defined by the developer

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
Data structure



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Variables representation




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

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- Global flows: Sensors and probes
- Genericity




Creating a new project



Packages


- Definitions of
 - Scade operators
 - Imported operators
 - Constants
 - Types
 - Sensors
 - Packages
- Inside or outside a package



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
Management of types (1/3)



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
Management of types (2/3)



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Management of types (3/3)



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Integers and reals


Integers

- Binary 0b01001
- Octal 0563
- Decimal 9637
- Hexadecimal 0xAF6C



Encoding

- short, int, long
 - Float, double
- } Shall be defined by the user

Defining a constant



Changing an object properties





Keyword list

■ Scade keywords

- abstract, activate, and, assume, automaton, bool, case, char, clock, const, default, div, do, else, elsif, emit, end, enum, every, false, fby, final, flatten, fold, foldi, foldw, foldwi, function, guarantee, group, if, imported, initial, int, is, last, let, make, map, mapfold, mapi, mapw, mapwi, match, merge, mod, node, not, numeric, of, onreset, open, or, package, parameter, pre, private, probe, public, real, restart, resume, returns, reverse, sensor, sig, specialize, state, synchro, tel, then, times, transpose, true, type, unless, until, var, when, where, with, xor


■ + Targeted programming language keywords

Quick check




The quick check performs syntax and semantics verification
It shall be frequently used


Symbol editor



Edition of the symbol



Use of the symbol



Display types / variable names / ...

The screenshot shows the GNC software interface. On the left, a tree view shows the project structure with 'GNC' expanded to show 'Interface' and its inputs/outputs. A 'Display Options' menu is open, showing options like 'Display Local Variables', 'Display Internal Variables', 'Display Local Types', 'Display Internal Types', 'Display Pin Banks', 'Display Pin Names', 'Display Notes', and 'Centered Labels'. The main window displays a block diagram with inputs 'Input1' (bool) and 'Input2' (T_QUATERNION), a central addition block (+), and outputs 'Output1' (real) and 'Output2' (T_QUATERNION).

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Generation of documentation

The screenshot shows the GNC software interface with the 'Reporter' menu open. The 'Generate Document' option is highlighted. Other options in the menu include 'Settings...', 'Set Active Configuration...', 'Resolve Inconsistencies...', 'Compute Types', and 'Launch MTC Acquisition'.

The 'Set Active Configuration' dialog box is shown, with a list of configurations: HTML, RTF, and MTC. The 'Set Active' button is highlighted.

Issue No.: 1 Page: 1

No classified

Scade 6 Training

Scade basic features training, Scade 6 new advanced features training




Summary:
This model is used as a support of the training on Scade 6

Company: EADS Astrium Space Transportation
Authors: David Lesens
Reference: TE42
Index: 1.0
Date: 2007/10/29

Distribution List: Internal distribution only


Report customization



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
Code generation customization



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File management



Scade6Training.xscade
ImportedOperator.xscade
OutsidePackageOperator.xscade
ActivationPackage.xscade
ArrayPackage.xscade
AutomatonPackage.xscade
Cours.xscade
Genericity.xscade
ProbePackage.xscade
Proof.xscade

ynchronous programming – David LESENS










Documentation

- Welcome to SCADE 6.0
 - Getting Started with SCADE
 - Scade Language Tutorial
 - Scade Language Primer
 - Scade Language Reference Manual
 - SCADE User Manual
 - SCADE Technical Manual
 - SCADE Libraries Manual
 - SCADE UML Metamodel Card
 - SCADE Gateway for Rhapsody Guidelines
 - Simulink™ Gateway Guidelines
 - Simulink™ Modeling Guidelines
 - RTOS Wrapper Guidelines
- About Requirements Management Gateway documentation, check from RMG interface at Help > Documentation or Coupling Notes

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Overview

- Synchronous model 
- Introduction to the Scade language 
- Editing a Scade model 
- Activation conditions 
- Automata 
- Arrays 
- Iterations 
- Global flows: Sensors and probes 
- Genericity 

“IF” operator

`x = if b then y else z`



If “b” is true, “x” takes the value “y”,
else, “x” takes the value “z”

Note:

Does not mean

If “b” is true, execute “y”,
else, execute “z”

If versus IfBlock




```
int IfWithNodes(bool cond) {
    int yf, yg;
    yf=f (); yg=g();
    if (cond) { y = yf; }
    else { y = yg; }
    return y;
}
```

**Both branch
are executed**

```
void IfBlockWithNodes(bool cond) {
    int y;
    if (cond) { y = f (); }
    else { y = g (); }
}
```

**Only one branch
is executed**

When Block



```
int Case(T_ENUM enumerated) {
    switch (enumerated) {
        case black :
            y = 1;
            break;
        case red :
            y = 2;
            break;
        case green :
            y = 3;
            break;
    }
    return y;
}
```

Activation conditions



■ Activation condition

- Condition true = Block activated
- Condition false = Previous outputs used (was "conduct" in Scade 5) or Default values

- Init values before first use

■ Restart condition

- Condition true = Internal memory reset



Activation: Example (1/3)

$x = a + b$, initial default value 5, activation condition c




$y = a + b$, default value 5, activation condition c

	Default values		Computed values		
c	0	0	1	0	1
a	3	6	3	2	3
b	3	2	-1	1	4
x	5	5	2	2	7
y	5	5	2	5	7

Last computed values

Default value

Activation: Example (2/3)





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```


if (Activate) {
    Output_default_initial_value = A();
    Output_default_value = A();
} else {
    if (init) Output_default_initial_value = 5; }
    Output_default_value = 5;
init = false;
    
```



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
og



Overview


- Synchronous model
- Introduction to the Scade language
- Editing a Scade model
- Activation conditions
- Automata
- Arrays
- Iterations
- Global flows: Sensors and probes
- Genericity

SCADE at a glance: Automaton



Data flow and automata

- A node is composed of
 - Equations (data-flow)
 - Automata (event driven)
- An automaton is composed of
 - States
 - Transitions
- A state is composed of
 - Equations
 - Automata



Principles of Automata

■ Semantics equivalence

- There exists a data-flow model semantically equivalent to any automaton

■ Automaton scheduling

- At most one transition fired *per cycle*
- Exactly one active state *per cycle*
(except then parallel states are defined)


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States

■ A state can be

- An initial state / a final state
- Hidden / nested



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Automaton simulation

Graph

Active state

Watch

Package1:Automaton/start: false

Package1:Automaton/stop: false

Variable

Package1:Automaton/start false

Package1:Automaton/stop false

Cycle: 11 1100 ms Latency:

Cycle Action


0-11 User Input

For Help, press F1


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Transitions

- A transition can
 - have a **weak** pre-emption
 - have a **strong** pre-emption
 - be **synchronized**
- It can have
 - A guard
 - An action
- It has a priority
- It can be with or without a history



Graphical transitions



Strong and weak transitions

- **Strong transition**
 - The transition is triggered before the state execution
 - ➔ The guard **can not** depend on the current value of a data
- **Weak transition** (or "weak delayed")
 - The state is executed before the transition triggering
 - ➔ The guard **can** depend on the current value of a data

Strong and weak transition


The image shows two UML State Machine Diagrams (SMDs) illustrating strong and weak transitions. The top diagram, labeled <SM1>, shows a transition from STATE_1 to STATE_2 triggered by the event 'EVENT'. STATE_1 has a transition 'last 'S1 + 1' to S1, and STATE_2 has a transition 'last 'S1 + 4' to S1. The bottom diagram, labeled <SM2>, shows a similar transition from STATE_1 to STATE_2 triggered by 'EVENT'. STATE_1 has a transition 'last 'S2 + 1' to S2, and STATE_2 has a transition 'last 'S2 + 4' to S2. Below the diagrams is a simulator window showing two waveforms: 'AUTOMATA-STRONG_WEAK/S1: 15' and 'AUTOMATA-STRONG_WEAK/S2: 12'. To the right is a variable table:

Variable	Value	Path
EVENT	false	AUT
S1	15	AUT
S2	12	AUT


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Example (1/2)

Strong transition



Weak transition




start				T						
stop								T		
count strong	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	4	4	4
count weak	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	4	4	4

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Example (2/2)

The behaviours of the two following models are equivalent



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Synchronized transition


- A synchronized transition
 - Has no guard
 - Is triggered as soon as all nested automata reach a final state

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Example

- **Start1 received**
 - o Still in protection state
- **Start2 received**
 - o Final states reached
- **Transition inactive triggered**




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Transition history


- **Transition without history**
 - The state resumes its execution
 - The memories are reset
- **Transition with history**
 - The state resumes its execution
 - The memories are **not** reset
- **Two types of memories**
 - PRE : **local** to the state
 - LAST : **common** to the node



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Transition with history



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

Shared memory

- Data flow point of view
 - Access to the last value of a flow in its scope
 - “pre expression”
- Mode automata point of view
 - Access to values computed in other states
 - “last ‘x’”


(“x” is a **named flow**, not an expression
 → utilization of ‘)

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
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Modifying the default action




Modification of the default behaviour




Generated documentation

Name	Type	Properties
count	int	default last 'count - 1
		last 5


Automator



Automator




Automator




Signals


- A signal can be
 - Present → true
 - Absent → false
- A signal can not be
 - An input / output
- ≠ Boolean value
 - A Boolean value keeps its previous value then non updated in a state




Automator S1



Automator S2




Automator S3



Composition and communication

- A signal can be
 - Emitted in a state
 - Emitted on a transition
- A transition can be triggered by a signal






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Factor


- A factor specifies on many time a condition must be true
 - In a data flow view
 - In a guard (automaton)



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
Time-out with factor



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Fork



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
Master 2 – Critical System – Synchronous programming – David LESENS

Overview

- Synchronous model 
- Introduction to the Scade language 
- Editing a Scade model 
- Activation conditions 
- Automata 
- Arrays 
- Iterations 
- Global flows: Sensors and probes 
- Genericity 

Arrays definition

- Restrictions
 - Static size
 - First element = index 0
- Definitions
 - type VECTOR = real ^ 4 ;
 - type MATRIX_2_3 = real ^ 3 ^ 2 ;
 - 2 lines, 3 columns
 - typedef real LINE_3[3];
 - typedef LINE_3 MATRIX_2_3 [2];



Type	Definition	Co
T_MATRIX_2_3	<array>	
	2	
	3	real

Editing array types

Type name

Array size


Array type

```
Generated code
typedef _real array_2[2];
typedef array_2 array_1[3];
typedef array_1 T_MATRIX_3_2__ArrayPackage;
```

Array access

Array5=[2,4,6,8,10], Index=3


Dynamic




Static



Assignment



Some operators on arrays



Overview


- Synchronous model
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Iterations

- Equivalent to “for” in C

**Map / Mapi / Mapw / Mapiw
Fold / Foldi / Foldl / Foldiw**

Map



Size of the input vector

```
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {  
    MapInt5[i] = FirstInt5[i] + SecondInt5[i];  
}
```

MAP: Apply the operator **successively**
on each element of the input vector(s)
element[i] .element'[i]

Fold

```

FoldInt = InputInt;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
    FoldInt = FoldInt + FirstInt5[i];
}

```

FOLD: Apply **recursively** the operator on input vector element[i] .element[i+1]

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Mapfold

```

MapFold1Int = InputInt;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
    add_2_ArrayPackage(MapFold1Int, FirstInt5[i],
    &MapFold1Int, &MapFold2Int[i]);
}

```

Nodes used with a mapfold iterator should duplicate their output
We obtain both results at the same time

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Mapi = Map with iterator as input

```

for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
    MapiInt5[i] = i + FirstInt5[i];
}

```

The index of the iteration is the first argument of the node

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Foldi = Fold with iterator as input

```

FoldiInt = InputInt;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
    FoldiInt = i + FoldiInt;
}


```

The input flow is the iterator

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Mapw / Foldw = Partial operators

- Capability to stop an iteration on a Boolean condition computed by the operator




As soon as the condition is false, the iteration is topped

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Mapw = Map partial operator



```

MapwExitIndexInt = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
    if (ConditionBool) {
        add(FirstInt5[i], SecondInt5[i], &ConditionBool, &MapwInt5[i]);
        MapwExitIndexInt = i + 1;
    } else { MapwInt5[i] = 4; }
}
    
```

The iteration can be stopped

Default value after the Iteration stop

It is recommended to not use this operator (WCET)

06/10/2010 p138

Mapwi = Mapi + Mapw

```

MapwiExitIndexInt = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
    if (ConditionBool)
        add(i, FirstInt5[i], &ConditionBool, &MapwiInt5[i]);
    MapwiExitIndexInt = i + 1;
} else { outC->MapwiInt5[i] = 4; }

```

The iteration can be stopped

The iterator is the first argument

Default value after the Iteration stop

It is recommended to not use this operator (WCET)

06/10/2010 p139

Foldw = Fold partial operator

```

FoldwInt = InputInt;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
    if (ConditionBool) { break; }
    add(FoldwInt, FirstInt5[i], &ConditionBool, &tmp);
    FoldwInt = tmp;
}

```

The iteration can be stopped

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Foldwi = Foldi + Foldw

```

FoldwiInt5 = InputInt; tmp = ConditionBool;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
  if (ConditionBool) { break; }
  add(i, FoldwiInt5, & ConditionBool, &tmp);
  FoldwiInt5 = tmp;
}
FoldwiExitIndexInt = i;

```

The iteration can be stopped

The input flow is the iterator


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Iteration summary

- Map = Successive application
- Fold = Recursive application
- Mapfold = Map + Fold
- Mapi = Map with iterator as input
- Foldi = Fold with iterator as input
- Mapw = Map partial operator
- Mapwi = Mapi + Mapw
- Foldw = Fold partial operator
- Foldwi = Foldi + Foldw


06/10/2010 p142 Master 2 – Critical System – Synchronous programming – David LESENS

Example 1




Example 2: cross product


Compute scalar product












Compute vector norm



Compute cross product




Overview

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Sensors

- Sensor: Global system input


Input temperature
Output heater




```
extern _int aimed_temperature__ProbePackage;
```

Probes

■ Probe: Global system output



```
typedef struct { /* context */  
  _bool heater; /* outputs */  
  _bool commanded_heater; /* probes */  
} C_controller_ProbePackage;
```



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
Overview

- Synchronous model [👉](#)
- Introduction to the Scade language [👉](#)
- Editing a Scade model [👉](#)
- Activation conditions [👉](#)
- Automata [👉](#)
- Arrays [👉](#)
- Iterations [👉](#)
- Global flows: Sensors and probes [👉](#)
- Genericity [👉](#)


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Generic operator definition




	Name	Type
Input	arg	'T
Output	square_out	'T



Name	Generic Type
'T	numeric

Definition of a generic numeric type



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Generic operator instantiation

```
int GenericSquare_int ( int arg ) {
    int square_out;
    square_out = arg * arg;
    return square_out;
}
```

```
real GenericSquare_real ( real arg ) {
    real square_out;
    square_out = arg * arg;
    return square_out;
}
```

```
void Specialization( int argInt; real argReal;
                    int squareInt; real squarereal; ) {
    *squareReal = GenericSquare_real ( argReal );
    *squareInt = GenericSquare_int ( argInt );
}
```

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
Definition of parameters

The screenshot shows the SCADE IDE interface for a library component named `lib_vector`. The left pane displays a tree view of the component's structure, including folders for Constants, Types, Operators, and Interface. The `Interface` folder is expanded, showing a `size` parameter. A red box highlights the `size` parameter in the tree view, with a red arrow pointing to a text box that reads "Definition of a generic size ('parameter')".

The main workspace shows a block diagram of the component. It features two input ports labeled `LEFT` and `RIGHT`, and one output port labeled `REAL_RESULT`. The diagram includes a multiplication block (`×`) and an addition block (`+`). The multiplication block is labeled `ap<size>` and the addition block is labeled `fo<size>`. Both labels are circled in red. The output of the multiplication block is connected to the input of the addition block, and the output of the addition block is connected to the `REAL_RESULT` port. A constant `0.0` is also connected to the addition block.

At the bottom of the slide, there is a footer: "06/10/2010 p151 Master 2 – Critical System – Synchronous programming – David LESENS".

Parameter instantiation









The screenshot shows the Properties window for the block diagram. The window has tabs for General, Declaration, Use, Size Parameters, and Comments. The `Size Parameters` tab is selected, and the `size` parameter is set to the value 3, which is circled in red.

```

REAL_RESULT = 0.0;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
    REAL_RESULT = REAL_RESULT + (*LEFT)[i] * (*RIGHT)[i];
}
return REAL_RESULT;
    
```

Overview

- Critical real-time embedded software 
- Principles of the approach 
 - Introduction 
 - Formal semantics 
- SCADE 
- Model validation 


Software validation

Correct software

- No runtime errors
- Satisfaction of real time constraints
- Compliance with the expected results

Solutions

- Manual review
- Dynamic testing
 - A code level
 - At model level
- Semantics checking
- Abstract interpretation
- Formal proof



Semantics verification (1/2)

Semantics of a SCADE model

- Syntax
- Typing verification
 - Types compatibility
 - Example: Integer \neq real
- Non uninitialized variables
- Temporal causality
- ...

Temporal causality

SCADE is an equational language

- The evaluation order depends only on data flows

$\left. \begin{array}{l} x = y; \\ y = z; \end{array} \right\} \longrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{“}y = z\text{” evaluated first} \\ \text{“}x = y\text{” evaluated secondly} \end{array} \right.$

$\left. \begin{array}{l} x = y; \\ y = z; \\ z = x; \end{array} \right\} \longrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Impossible computation of the evaluation order} \\ \text{“}x = y = z = x = \dots\text{”} \end{array} \right.$

Causality problem

Semantics verification (2/2)

A SCADE model with a correct semantics is:

- Complete
- Consistent
- Implementable
- ➔ The good properties of a specification
- ➔ “Semantics check” to be systematically performed



But does the software behave as expected?

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
Software validation

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What is testing?

Compare the observed behaviour
with the expected behaviour

▪ Several levels of test

- Unitary / integration / validation / system qualification
- Host / target
- Real equipment / simulator
- “White” box / “Black” box

At code or
model level

Objectives of unitary tests

- **Robustness**
 - Absence of “runtime error”
- **Functional validity**
 - Comparison with the expected results
- **Contractual objectives**
 - **Coverage**
 - Intuitively satisfactory
 - Measurable
 - But not a proof of exhaustiveness

Unitary tests: Coverage

```


Procedure f(x : in real; y: in real; z : out real)
  if (x > 1.0) or (x < -1.0) then
    z := y/x;
  else
    z := y;
  if z < 2.0 then
    z = 2.0;
  
```

Coverage


- **branch** (x=2.0, y=6.0), (x=-1.0,y=1.0)
- **decision** + (x=-2, y=3.0)
- **path** + (x=2.0, y=1.0), (x=0.5,y=2.0)

Coverage of a SCADE model

Warning
Both branches
are executed
whatever
the value of “inc”



Integration test



Limit of the white box approach

- The presence of a spy may modify the **real time behaviour**
- What happens if the debugger / **simulator** has ... a bug?

Validation

▪ Black box tests

- Control of the inputs
- Observations of the outputs

*Non
intrusive*

▪ On host or on target

- Tests on target are more expensive


Software validation

Correct software

- No runtime errors
- Satisfaction of real time constraints
- Compliance with the expected results

Solutions

- Manual review
- Dynamic testing
 - A code level
 - At model level
- Semantics checking
- Abstract interpretation
- Formal proof




Costly
Error prone

Costly
Non exhaustive

**But proof can not
completely replace testing**


Software testing



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
Principle of the proof



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Proof limitation



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
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Example (1)

```
int a[1000];  
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {  
    for (j = 0; j < 1000-i; j++) {  
        // 0 <= i <= 999  
        // 0 <= j <= 999  
        a[i+j] = 0;  
    }  
}
```

Warning

Non conclusive



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
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Example (2)

```
int a[1000];  
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {  
  for (j = 0; j < 1000-i; j++) {  
    // 0 <= i and 0 <= j  
    // i+j <= 999  
    Safe → a[i+j] = 0;  
  }  
}
```

Safe

Conclusive




Safety et liveness properties

- **Safety**

“Bad” things never happen

- **Liveness**

Some thing “good” will eventually happen in the future



The proof tool of SCADE can not prove liveness properties

Interest of the liveness properties

▪ “Liveness” property / “timed” property

- Example: if an error is detected, the software shall raise an alarm toward the user
 - **Liveness**: the alarm will mandatorily be raised (one day or another)

But **when**?

→ *Not acceptable for a critical real time piece of software*

- ❖ **Timed property**: the alarm will mandatorily be raised 1 second after the failure occurrence

→ **Safety property**


Formal proof

- “Mathematical” exhaustive demonstration that a piece of software/code satisfied a property

→ Rarely the case!

A piece software generally satisfies a property only in a **correct environment**

The software is part of a complex system



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Formal proof principles

- Software under validation
- Properties to be satisfied
- Software environment

$(\square \text{ correct environment}) \wedge \text{software} \Rightarrow \text{properties}$

- Environment in open or close loop

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
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Expression of properties

Notion of observer

- An **observer** is a software observing the software under validation and returning “true” as long as the property is satisfied
 - Observation of the software inputs
 - Observation of the software outputs
- Idem for the environment properties

Observers in SCADE



- Use for testing (**oracle**)
- Use by SCADE proof tool

Non deterministic environment (1/2)

The software **environment** is generally not fully **deterministic**

- Human action
- Failure
- ...


➔ **Non deterministic environment**

But SCADE is a deterministic language!

Non deterministic environment (2/2)

The non determinism is modelled by an additional input

Example: Failure occurrence



Assertion

An assertion allows to restrict an environment “too much” non deterministic

Example:

- Input “gf” models a gyroscope failure
- Input “tf” models a thruster failure une panne d’une tuyère
 - To develop a “one fault tolerant” system

Hypothesis: `assert #(gf, tf)`

The End