



### Introduction to Quantum Computing

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### The superiority of Quantum Computing

### Cryptography

Secrete Key Distribution Protocol [Bennett, Brassard'84]
 Implementation: ~100 km

### **Information Theory**

 EPR Paradox [Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen'35] Realization: 1982 [Orsay]

 Teleportation [Bennett, Brassard, Crépeau, Jozsa, Peres, Wootters'93 Realization: 1997 [Innsbruck]

### Algorithms

- Polynomial algorithm for Period Finding [Simon, Shor'94]
   ⇒ Factorization, Discrete Logarithm
- Quadratic speedup for Database Search [Grover'96]
- Quantum computer?
  - 1995: 2-qubit [ENS], 2000: 5-qubit [IBM], 2006: 12-qubit [Waterloo

### Quantum proofs for classical theorems

- http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.3376 [Drucker, de Wolf'09]



### Formal concepts

Model of computation

What is a machine, a program?

Mathematical model of a computer?

Hardness of a problem

Calculable / Non-calculable

Easy / Hard

[Turing 1936]: Turing machine, calculability, universality

### Church-Turing theses

- Weak version
  - Any *reasonable* model of computation can be simulated on a Turing machine reasonable: physically realizable
    - Turing machine  $\approx$  today computer
- Strong version
  - Any reasonable model of computation can be *efficiently* simulated on a *probabilistic* Turing machine

efficiently: using same amount of resources (time and space)









### **Computers?**

### **Classical computing**

- Turing machine, calculability, universality [Turing 1936]
- Proposition: EDVAC (Electronic Discrete VAriable Computer) [von Neumann ]
- First computer: Mark I [Robinson-Tootill-Williams 1949]

### Quantum computing

- Idea: simulation of quantum systems [Feynman 1982]
- Technology: 2-qubit [1995], 5-qubit [2000], 12-qubit [2006]

### Validity of Church-Turing theses

Weak version is still valid

Calculability: quantum and classical computation have same power

- Strong version could be violated

Complexity: evidences that quantum computers can be exponentially faster than classical computers

### In this talk

### I qubit

- Definition
- Quantum key distribution

### 2 qubits

- Definition
- EPR Paradox and applications

### Algorithms

Toward factorization

Quantum Fourier transform

- Applications
- Generalization
- Grover algorithm

### Conclusion





### Qubit state



# Qubit evolutionLogical bit<br/>- Function: $f: \{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}, \quad b \mapsto f(b)$ <br/>Probabilistic bitProbabilistic bit<br/> $P = \begin{pmatrix} p & p' \\ q & q' \end{pmatrix}, \quad d \mapsto d' = Pd$ Quantum bit<br/>- Evolution: unitary transformation $G \in \mathcal{U}(2)$ ( $\Rightarrow$ reversible)

Definition:  $G\in \mathbb{C}^{2 imes 2}$  s.t.  $G^{*}G=\mathrm{Id}$ 

$$|\psi
angle$$
 ...... $|\psi'
angle = G|\psi
angle$   
 $|\psi'
angle = G|\psi
angle$  ...... $|\psi
angle$ 





### Quantum key distribution

### Problem

Setting

No prior shared secret information between Alice and Bob Authenticated classical channel 11

- Goal: Get a private key between Alice and Bob

### **Classical results**

- Impossible, since all the information is in the canal
- However, one **can** (using randomized techniques):

Amplify the privacy of an imperfect private key by shortening it

### Incertitude in the measure



### Impossibility of cloning

- Impossibility of duplicating an unknown state
- Proof based on the linearity of quantum transformations



- If c=d, Alice & Bob know a=b without revealing a,b
  - "without revealing" can be formalized...



### Preliminaries: Tensor product

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### Vector spaces

- V, W: vector spaces
- $V \otimes W$  is the free vector space Span ( $v \otimes w : v \in V, w \in W$ )

with equivalence relations

```
(v_1+v_2)\otimes w = v_1\otimes w + v_2\otimes w
```

```
v \otimes (w_1 + w_2) = v \otimes w_1 + v \otimes w_2
```

```
(c \cdot v) \otimes w = v \otimes (c \cdot w) = c \cdot (v \otimes w)
```

### Linear maps

- S:  $V \rightarrow X$ , T:  $W \rightarrow Y$  : linear maps
- $S \otimes T$ :  $V \otimes W \rightarrow X \otimes Y$  is the linear map satisfying

 $S \otimes T(v \otimes w) = S(v) \otimes T(w)$ 

(and extended by linearity)

### **Applications**

- Joint probability distributions on spaces V, W

 $\mathcal{D}(\forall xW) = \mathcal{D}(\forall) \otimes \mathcal{D}(W) \neq \mathcal{D}(\forall) x \mathcal{D}(W) \text{ (: product distributions)}$ 









### Bell-CHSH inequality as a classical game

### Game

- Alain and Bob share some initial information but cannot communicate
- Alain receives a random bit x, Bob y
- Alain returns a bit a, Bob b



- Theorem: the best probabilistic strategy is not better than the best deterministic strategy



### Superdense coding [1992]

### Problem

- Alice & Bob share an EPR state:  $|\beta_{00}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$
- Alice wants to send two bits xy to Bob
- But Alice can only send one qubit to Bob





### Realization of teleportation

### Circuit $|\psi\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$ $\longrightarrow$ $|x\rangle$ $|0\rangle \leftarrow H$ $\longrightarrow$ $|y\rangle$ $|0\rangle \leftarrow |y\rangle$ $|\psi_{xy}\rangle$

### Exercise

- Compute the state of the system before the measure
- Write the qubit state  $|\psi_{xy}
  angle$  as a function of observed values x,y
- Explain the end of the protocol

### Realizations

- I photon [Zeilinger et al : Innsbruck'97]
- I photon, 6 km [Gisin et al : Genève'02]
- I atom [Blatt et al : Innsbruck'04]
- Today: over 100km

Coin flipping

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### Problem Alice and Bob are fare away They want to flip a coin in a fair way but they don't trust each other Classically

- Solutions based on harness assumptions of combinatorial problems
- No unconditionally secure solution

### Quantumly

- There exists a protocol with maximal bias 0,25 [2001]
- There is no protocol with bias better than 0,207 [2002]
  - There exists a protocol with maximal bias 0,207 [2009]

### Weak version: election

- Alice wants head
- Bob wants tail
- There exists a protocol with arbitrarily small bias [2007]





### EPR based coin flipping

### Main idea

Assume Alice & Bob share an EPR state



- Alice & Bob observe their qubit and get bit *a*,*b* 

### Fact

- a=b with probability I
- a (resp. b) is a uniform random bit

### **Problems**

- Who create the EPR state?
- If Alice does, Bob needs to check that is an EPR state: And for instance not  $|00\rangle \rightarrow a=b=0$  with probability |
- In ordert o check the EPR state, Bob needs the 2 qubits

Then Alice needs to check that Bob gives back the correct qubit



### Logical computing

### Gates

A gate C is a function on at most 3 qubits
 Example: AND, OR, NOT, ...

### Circuit

- A circuit is a sequence of gates  $C = C_L \dots C_2 C_1$ 
  - The size of C is its number L of gates
- C computes a function f if for all input x:  $C(x, 0^k) = (f(x), z)$



### Theorem

- Any function can be computed by a circuit using only NOT, OR, AND gates



### On the query operator $S_f$

### Normal form

- Function:  $f: \{0,1\}^n 
  ightarrow \{0,1\}^m$
- Circuit:  $U_f: |x
  angle |0
  angle \mapsto |x
  angle |f(x)
  angle \ |x
  angle |y
  angle \mapsto |x
  angle |y\oplus f(x)
  angle$

### Circuit for $S_f$

- Boolean function:  $f: \{0,1\}^n 
  ightarrow \{0,1\}$ 
  - Ancilla:  $|\psi
    angle=rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0
    angle-|1
    angle)$









### General solution for Deutsh-Jozsa





### Bernstein-Vazirani

### Problem

- Oracle input:  $f:\{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}$  a black-box function such that  $f(x) = a \cdot x$ for some fixed  $a \in \{0, 1\}^n$
- Output: a

### Query complexity

```
    Randomized: n
        Query f(0<sup>i-1</sup> | 0<sup>n-i</sup>)=a<sub>i</sub>, for i=1,2,...,n

    Quantum: 1
```

•Quantum circuit

$$|0
angle \bullet \cdots \bullet QFT \bullet \bullet S_f \bullet \bullet QFT \bullet \bullet \mathsf{Measure} \bullet \bullet \bullet |a
angle$$



### On the difficulty of fatorizing

### **RSA Challenges**

### - http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs

Challenge Number	Prize (\$US)	Status	Submission Date	Submitter(s)
<u>RSA-576</u>	\$10,000	Factored	December 3, 2003	J. Franke et al.
<u>RSA-640</u>	\$20,000	Factored	November 2, 2005	F. Bahr et al.
<u>RSA-704</u>	\$30,000	Not Factored		
<u>RSA-768</u>	\$50,000	Not Factored		
<u>RSA-896</u>	\$75,000	Not Factored		
RSA-1024	\$100,000	Not Factored		
<u>RSA-1536</u>	\$150,000	Not Factored		
RSA-2048	\$200,000	Not		

### – RSA-640 (193 digits) :

310741824049004372135750035888567930037346022842727545720161948823206440518081504556346829671723286782437916272838 033415471073108501919548529007337724822783525742386454014691736602477652346609

1634733645809253848443133883865090859841783670033092312181110852389333100104508151212118167511579

1900871281664822113126851573935413975471896789968515493666638539088027103802104498957191261465571

 RSA Algorithm (allows private communication) security based on the difficulty of factorizing

### From period finding to factorization

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### •Theorem [Simon-Shor'94]

- Finding the period of *any* function on an abelian group can be done in quantum time poly  $(\log |G|)$ 

### Order finding

- Input: integers n and a such that gcd(a,n)=1
- Output: the smallest integer  $q \neq 0$  such that  $a^q \equiv 1 \mod n$ 
  - Reduction to period finding: the period of  $x \rightarrow a^x \mod n$  is q

### **Factorization**

- Input: integer n
- Output: a nontrivial divisor of n

**Reduction** : Factorization  $\leq_{R}$  Order finding

- Check that gcd(a,n)=1
- Compute the order q of  $a \mod n$
- Restart if q is odd or  $a^{q/2} \neq -1 \mod n$
- Otherwise  $(a^{q/2} 1)(a^{q/2} + 1) = 0 \mod n$
- Return  $gcd(a^{q/2} \pm 1, n)$

### Simon's problem

### Problem

- Oracle input:  $f: \{0,1\}^n o \{0,1\}^n$  a black-box function





### Finding the period

### Construction of a linear system

- After n+k iterations:  $y^1,y^2,\ldots,y^{n+k}\in s^\perp$
- s is solution of the linear system in t:

$$\begin{cases} y^{1} \cdot t = 0 \\ y^{2} \cdot t = 0 \\ \vdots \\ y^{n+k} \cdot t = 0 \end{cases} \longleftrightarrow \begin{cases} y_{1}^{1}t_{1} + y_{2}^{1}t_{2} + \ldots + y_{n}^{1}t_{n} = 0 \\ y_{1}^{2}t_{1} + y_{2}^{2}t_{2} + \ldots + y_{n}^{2}t_{n} = 0 \\ \vdots \\ y_{1}^{n+k}t_{1} + y_{2}^{n+k}t_{2} + \ldots + y_{n}^{n+k}t_{n} = 0 \end{cases}$$

- If  $s=0^n$  the  $y^i$  are of rank n with proba  $\geq 1-1/2^k$
- If  $s \neq 0^n$  the  $y^i$  are of rank n-1 with proba  $\geq |-1/2^{k+1}$ 
  - System solutions: **0**<sup>n</sup> and **s**

### Complexity

- Constructing the system: O(n) queries, time O(n)
- Solving the system: no query, time  $O(n^3)$







### Grover search algorithm

### Grover problem

- Oracle input :  $f: \{0,1\}^n 
  ightarrow \{0,1\}$  such that  $\exists ! x_0 : f(x_0) = 1$
- Output :  $x_0$
- Constraint : f is a black-box



### Query complexity

- Randomized:  $\Theta(2^n)$
- Quantum:  $\Theta(\sqrt{2^n})$

 $n=2\implies 1$  query

## Preliminary remarks $\begin{aligned} \text{Implementation of } f\\ \sum_{x} \alpha_{x} |x\rangle & \longleftrightarrow \quad \sum_{f} \cdots \sum_{x} (-1)^{f(x)} \alpha_{x} |x\rangle = \sum_{x} \alpha_{x} |x\rangle - 2\alpha_{x_{0}} |x_{0}\rangle \\ \text{Double Hadamard gate}\\ |x_{1}\rangle & \longleftrightarrow \quad H \longrightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + (-1)^{x_{1}}|1\rangle) \\ |x_{2}\rangle & \longleftrightarrow \quad H \longrightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + (-1)^{x_{2}}|1\rangle) \\ |x\rangle = |x_{1}x_{2}\rangle & \longleftrightarrow \quad H \longrightarrow \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (-1)^{x \cdot y} |y\rangle \end{aligned}$

with  $x \cdot y = x_1y_1 + x_2y_2 \mod 2$ 





### Geometrical analysis, general case



How many quantum algorithms exist?	50			
Unstructured problems				
- Grover algorithm [1996]				
Algebraic problems				
<ul> <li>Simon-Shor algorithm [1994]</li> </ul>				
Well structured problems				
<ul> <li>Classical algorithms are optimal!</li> </ul>				
Problems with few structures				
<ul> <li>Quantum walk based algorithms [2003]</li> </ul>				
quantum analogy of random walks				
<ul> <li>Examples</li> </ul>				
Element Distinctness, Commutativity: n <sup>2/3</sup> [2004]				
Triangle Finding: n <sup>9/7</sup> (lower bound n) [2013]				
Square Finding: n <sup>1.25</sup> (lower bound n) [2010]				
Matrix Multiplication: $n^{5/3}$ (lower bound $n^{3/2}$ ) [2006]				
AND-OR Tree evaluation: $\sqrt{n}$ [2007]				

### Where does the quantum superiority come from?

### **Entanglement?**

"Classical entanglement" exists: shared randomness
 Flip a coin 00 or 11

Share each bit between Alice and Bob

Alice/Bob uses its bit when he/she wants, their result are correlated

But quantum entanglement is "stronger"

Bell-CHSH inequality and applications

### Complex amplitudes?

- No: they can be simulated using only real amplitude

 $lpha|0
angle + eta|1
angle \simeq lpha_r|00
angle + lpha_i|01
angle + eta_r|10
angle + eta_i|11
angle \qquad \mathcal{U}(2^n) \simeq \mathcal{O}(2^{n+1})$ Negative amplitudes?

- Yes: they can induce destructive interferences

### Hardness of amplitudes?

- No: amplitudes must be easily computable for being physically realizable



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