

Algorithms for Stochastic Games

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Algorithms and Games

Solving Simple Stochastic Games

Solving Stochastic Games

Solving Stochastic Games with Signals

Conclusion

Computable functions

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- ▶ **Definition:** a function $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ is **computable** if it is computable by a **Turing machine**. Equivalent to Pascal programs which terminate. Alphabet $\{0, 1\}$ or Σ finite.

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- ▶ **Games on graphs:** the same algorithm works for games on graphs. States $S = S_1 \cup S_2$ controlled by player 1 or 2.

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- ▶ **Minimize $\sum_s v(s)$ with constraints:**

$$s \in S, \quad 0 \leq v(s) \leq 1$$

$$t \text{ target, } v(t) = 1$$

$$s \in S_1, \quad (s, u) \in E, \quad v(s) \geq v(u)$$

$$s \in S_R, \quad v(s) = \sum_{u \in S} p(s, u) \cdot v(u)$$

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- ▶ **Generalization**: perfect-information payoff games with stationary deterministic optimal strategies.

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- ▶ **Not exact computation**: converge to the value but no guarantee on the number of steps for a given precision. May be efficient in practice.

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- ▶ **Theorem [Tarski, 51]**: quantifier elimination. Truth of first order formula on reals is decidable.
- ▶ **Corollary [Chatterjee, 06]** : whether player 1 can guarantee payoff > 0 is decidable. Exponential time, polynomial space.

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- ▶ $\exists \sigma : S \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(I), \forall \tau : S \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(J), \exists v : S \rightarrow [0, 1], (\forall s \in S, (**)) \wedge (v(s_0) > 0)$.

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
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- ▶ Unlimited memory, unlimited speed.
- ▶ **Proof:** reduction to Post correspondence problem. **Actions in the game = indices of the PCP instance.** Reverse binary encoding, strategy wins with probability $\frac{1}{2} u_{i_1} u_{i_2} \cdots u_{i_n} + (1 - \frac{1}{2}) v_{i_1} v_{i_2} \cdots v_{i_n}$. Strategies win with proba $\frac{1}{2}$ iff $u_{i_1} u_{i_2} \cdots u_{i_n} = v_{i_1} v_{i_2} \cdots v_{i_n}$.

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- ▶ **Remark:** the same decision problem is undecidable for stochastic games with Büchi conditions.

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- ▶ Avoid reduction to first order logic.
- ▶ Finding a **polynomial-time** algorithm for **simple stochastic games**.